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According to the account proposed here, this early judgment is the reason why both experiments showed DLPFC activity in their observed neural correlates of later positive report. In contrast,  the subjects of Pitts et al. (2012) did not expect the question on visibility, and the observed neural correlates therefore instead reflected such stimulus-triggered quasi-descriptive activity that was sufficient for a positive judgment once the question was asked, considerably later. Thus, all of these findings can be qualitatively understood using the model and hypotheses proposed here. As will be clear from the next section, previous authors have argued that one or the other experiment provides a more accurate test of consciousness. The account proposed here rather suggests that the different experiments simply engaged  their subjects in self-judgment of consciousness in different ways. 6. Relation to some existing accounts of consciousness Dehaene et al. (2003, 2006, 2014) have argued for a global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness, originally suggested by Baars (1988). The widespread brain activation associated with reports of a visible T2 stimulus in an experiment such as that of Sergent et al. (2005, Figure ?Figure3A)3A) is, according to this view, a signature of T2 processing entering the hypothesized GNW, an interconnected set of areas [http://www.selleckchem.com/products/AP24534.html selleck chemicals] across the brain with the purpose of ��flexible sharing of information throughout the cortex [for example to] route a selected stimulus through a series of non-routine information processing stages�� (Dehaene et al., 2014, p. 79). A flexibly mapped, non-routine reaction to a stimulus, such as in the experiments discussed above, is assumed to require that the stimulus  first becomes conscious by entering the GNW, making consciousness and the GNW the bottleneck behind phenomena like the attentional blink or the psychological refractory period (Marti et al., 2012). Indeed, behavioral and neuronal aspects of these phenomena have been well accounted for by computational modeling of such a central ��routing�� resource (Dehaene et al., 2003; Zylberberg et al., 2010). Put succinctly, in the GNW account, if I am to (flexibly, non-routinely) respond to a stimulus, I first need to ��see�� it consciously, and consciousness is a limited resource. The model presented in this paper seems to be consistent with the experimental data and modeling work used to support the GNW hypothesis. What has been presented, here, as PFC-mediated flexible mappings between stimulus and response could be understood as identical to the flexible routing function attributed to the GNW, and could presumably be modeled precisely as by Zylberberg et al. (2010).