Відмінності між версіями «Personally--as cognitive judgments inside the mind of a social perceiver--they undoubtedly»

Поточна версія на 16:44, 24 листопада 2017

Personally--as cognitive judgments inside the thoughts of a social perceiver--they undoubtedly serve important interpersonal functions (Haidt, 2001; McCullough et al., 2013; Malle et al., 2014). Moral judgments respond for the presence of social audiences (Kurzban et al., 2007), elicit social distancing from dissimilar other individuals (Skitka et al., 2005), and trigger attempts to modify others' future behavior (Cushman et al., 2009). Provided that moral cognition ultimately serves a social regulatory function of guiding and coordinating social behavior (Cushman, 2013; Malle et al., 2014), additional forging the connections involving intrapersonal moral judgments and their interpersonal manifestations is going to be a vital direction for future study. The measurement of moral judgment will also require detailed comparison and integration. Existing models primarily examine a single sort of judgment--such as duty, wrongness, permissibility, or blame--and although all such judgments not surprisingly depend on data processing, they nonetheless differ in important strategies (Cushman, 2008; O'Hara et al., 2010; Malle et al., 2014). Wrongness and permissibility judgments normally take intentional actions as their object of judgment (Cushman, 2008). Thus, judging that it's wrong (or impermissible) to X implies that it's incorrect to intentionally X; it ordinarily tends to make little sense to say that unintentionally X-ing is wrong. In contrast, duty and blame take each intentional and unintentional actions as their object of judgment. Hence, one could be judged responsible (Schlenker et al., 1994) or blameworthy (Cushman, 2008; Young and Saxe, 2009) even for purely unintentional negative behavior. In addition, mainly because blame requires into account an agent's reasons for acting, those who commit negative actions for justified reasons--such as self defense (Piazza et al., 2013)--can beJudgment Timing and Information SearchOne domain in which the predictions from various models are decisively testable is the fact that of timing. Quite a few models assume, no less than implicitly, that people make specific judgments just before other folks. Both Cushman (2008) and Malle et al. (2014) posit that causality and SB-3CT biological activity MedChemExpress Procoxacin mental state judgments precede blame. Knobe's (2010) model predicts that initial moral judgments (e.g., about goodness or badness) precede mental state judgments, though the latter may perhaps precede full-fledged blame. Alicke's (2000) model suggests that blame (within the kind of spontaneous evaluations) need to occur prior to judgments about causality and mental states. Testing these predictions about timing can additional clarify the way in which moral judgments unfold and can adjudicate between claims created by existing models. Moreover, since blame takes into account an agent's causes for acting, these who commit negative actions for justified reasons--such as self defense (Piazza et al., 2013)--can beJudgment Timing and Info SearchOne domain in which the predictions from several models are decisively testable is that of timing. Many models assume, a minimum of implicitly, that people make particular judgments prior to other folks. Both Cushman (2008) and Malle et al. (2014) posit that causality and mental state judgments precede blame. Knobe's (2010) model predicts that initial moral judgments (e.g., about goodness or badness) precede mental state judgments, even though the latter may possibly precede full-fledged blame. Alicke's (2000) model suggests that blame (in the type of spontaneous evaluations) really should occur prior to judgments about causality and mental states.