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More generally, generativist and constructionist researchers agree about the basic thrust of the POS argument: the child cannot learn about the properties of empty categories, constraints on extraction, etc., from the input. What they disagree about is the conclusion that is to be drawn from this fact. For generative researchers, the fact that some grammatical principles or notions are unlearnable entails that they must be part of an innate UG. Constructionist researchers, on the other hand, draw a completely different conclusion: if X cannot be learned from the input, then we need a better linguistic theory��one that does not assume such an implausible construct. Thus, one of the basic principles of the constructionist approach is that ErbB linguists should focus on developing ��child-friendly�� grammars (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008; Goldberg, 2003; Tomasello, 2003, 2006; D?browska, 2004) rather than postulate an innate UG. Construction grammar attempts to capture all that speakers know about their language in terms of constructions��form-meaning pairings which can be simple or complex and concrete or partially or entirely schematic (i.e., they can contain one or more ��slots�� which can be elaborated by more specific units, allowing for the creation of novel expressions). Most construction grammar researchers also assume that children prefer relatively concrete, lexically-specific patterns which can be easily inferred from the input; more schematic patterns emerge later in development, as a result of generalization over the concrete units acquired earlier (Johnson, 1983; D?browska, 2000b; Tomasello, 2003, 2006; Diessel, 2004). Crucially, the mechanisms required to learn constructional schemas are also necessary to acquire relational terms such as verbs and prepositions (D?browska, 2004, 2009). Since we know that children are able to learn the meanings and selectional restrictions of verbs and prepositions, it follows that they are able to learn constructional schemas as well. Conclusion As we have seen, contemporary views on what is or is not in UG are wildly divergent. I have also argued that, although many arguments have been put forward in favor of some kind of an innate UG, there is actually very little evidence for its existence: the arguments for the innateness of specific linguistic categories or principles are either irrelevant (in that they are arguments for general innateness rather than linguistic innateness), based on false premises, or circular. Some generative linguists respond to criticisms of this kind by claiming that UG is an approach to doing linguistics rather than a specific hypothesis. For example, Nevins et al. (2009) in their critique of Everett��s work on Pirah?, assert that ��The term Universal Grammar (UG), in its modern usage, was introduced as a name for the collection of factors that underlie the uniquely human capacity for language��whatever they may turn out to be ��.