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g., Tononi, 2004, 2012; Dehaene et al., 2006, 2014; Lamme, 2006, 2010; Block, 2009; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). One possible reason for the lack of consensus regarding the NCC could be that researchers have thus far not taken sufficient care to separate the brain activity involved in the actual conscious awareness (the NCC proper) from brain activity corresponding to prerequisites for or consequences of that awareness (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). However, some researchers and philosophers argue that even if neuroscientists could reach perfect agreement on the NCC, there would still remain an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) regarding ��why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all�� (Block, 2009, p. 1111), and that explaining a mere function or ability such as Erlotinib in vivo discrimination and reporting of a stimulus does not solve the hard problem: explaining the first-person, subjective experience of that stimulus (Chalmers, 1995). This allegedly unexplained aspect of consciousness is sometimes referred to as the qualia, the ��raw feels,�� such as ��the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky�� (Jackson, 1982, p. 127), the ��what it is like�� (Nagel, 1974). Whether or not there is such an explanatory gap to be bridged, or equivalently such a hard problem to be solved, is the topic of another major debate in contemporary writing on consciousness. Many have argued that these gaps and problems are illusions, arising from dualistic thinking or otherwise misguided intuitions (e.g., Dennett, 1991; O'Regan and No?, 2001; Blackmore, 2012), and that something like qualia, such as discussed by the authors cited above, cannot exist (Dennett, 1988), at least not within the scope of science (Cohen and Dennett, 2011). Dennett (1991) has suggested what he calls the heterophenomenological approach to consciousness, whereby rather than asking questions like ��why do we have qualia?,�� which implicitly assume that first-person accounts of consciousness are true, we should ask questions like ��why do we say that we have qualia?.�� Blackmore (2012, 2015) has argued that even the very search for NCC bears the mark of dualistic thinking and is therefore bound for failure. O'Regan and No? (2001) also deny the existence of qualia, and have proposed a behavior-oriented account of consciousness, whereby conscious experience amounts to active and task-oriented prediction of how sensory inputs will change with motor actions: ��It is confused to think of the qualitative character of experience in terms of the occurrence of something (whether in the mind or brain).