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, 2001; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004), while strikingly less so in others, such as reasoning about false beliefs (Liu et al., 2008). As such, what we refer to more generally as ��theory of mind�� is but a placeholder for a suite of related systems that function at different levels of cognitive processing. Implicit, automatic and inflexible systems for agency detection, face recognition, gaze following, emotion processing, joint attention, and our na?ve theories of causality motivate a reflexive understanding of others�� behavior as resulting from underlying mental states (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). This reflexive reasoning is elaborated with explicit, verbal and flexible thought (Epley and Caruso, 2008), only when we have the cognitive resources and motivation to do so (Rhodes, 2014). As such, any account of how to foster theory of mind must take into consideration the various interconnected systems at play when people reason about the minds of others (Harwood and Farrar, 2010; Schaafsma et al., 2015). By understanding the parts of the process, we can begin to examine how to grease those gears and enhance our theory of mind capabilities. With such a framework in mind, we present behavioral synchrony, the act of keeping together in time with others, as a novel tool for honing and enhancing theory of mind. Specifically, we present evidence of the processes by which behavioral synchrony can correct for common CAL-101 purchase inaccuracies in mental state reasoning by motivating directed reflexive mental state reasoning, and decreasing the egocentrism that would otherwise inhibit more explicit reasoning about others�� mental worlds. Music and Behavioral Synchrony A recent study suggests that merely coordinating your actions with a complete stranger through participation in a musical game is sufficient to induce an empathic pain response of the same magnitude of that among very close friends (Martin et al., 2015). We argue that this choice of task, joint music making, is of special interest as it incorporates elements of synchronous action that are particularly capable of fostering theory of mind. The success of this intervention is particularly noteworthy considering the reported difficulties in enhancing theory of mind through explicit instruction. Specifically, studies that examine practicing and learning how to infer and engage with the minds of others in both typically developing and clinical samples (Ozonoff and Miller, 1995; Goldstein and Winner, 2012) remain inconclusive. Indeed, the difficulty in ��teaching�� theory of mind follows from the lack of a clearly defined relationship between experiential input (e.g., learning about mental states through parent�Cchild discourse; Sabbagh and Callanan, 1998; Farrant et al., 2011) and cognitive scaffolding (e.g., executive function; Benson et al., 2013) in the ontogeny of a theory of mind.