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It is proposed here that quasi-descriptive narratives account for some types of perceptual completion phenomena (Pessoa et al., 1998), such as in Dennett's (1991, 1992) oft-mentioned example with a wallpaper of identical images of Marilyn MCF2L Monroe. When glancing upon such a wallpaper, only one or a few portraits will be sensed with high resolution at the fovea; the non-foveated portraits will not be distinguishable from colored blobs, yet the ��perceptual experience�� is that of an entire wall of identical Marilyns. Dennett argued that the brain should not need to ��fill in�� the remaining Marilyns anywhere in the brain; it should be enough for the brain to just draw a conclusion on a symbolic level that, here, can be understood as a quasi-description A WALL FULL OF MARILYNS, and that this is enough to account for the ��perceptual experience�� in question. Experimentally, perceptual completion phenomena have in some cases been found to be associated with actual neural filling-in (e.g., De Weerd et al., 1995), in other cases not (e.g., von der Heydt et al., 2003), and in some cases a neural filling-in at lower levels seems to depend on feedback from higher levels (Sterzer et al., 2006), interpretable as feedback from quasi-description to quasi-depiction. To finalize the example with the lion (Figure ?(Figure2A),2A), based on a quasi-description such as LION IN BUSHES, I may come to articulate a verbal description of what I see, either overtly or covertly (in terms of brain function, the two may be rather closely related; Scott et al., 2013). The reason why I might select to generate an overt description is at least in this specific case most probably reward-related. For example, someone may have asked me to describe what I am currently seeing in a photo, and I thus seek the social reward of complying with instruction. Alternatively, I may really be in person on the savannah together with someone, such that there is a clear survival aspect to communicating my observation. In either case, the process can be understood as a high-level behavior DESCRIBE WHAT I AM SEEING having become activated, possibly implemented in PFC or maintained in sustained activity with excitation from PFC. This type of behavior will be referred to here as a task definition behavior. Considered in isolation, this is not a narrative behavior, but the overt speech act that it causes (��There is a lion in the bushes��) clearly is. 4. A heterophenomenological analysis of consciousness: when do we tend to say that we have a conscious experience? If, after giving my overt verbal report about the lion in the bushes, someone asks me whether I have ��a conscious experience of seeing the lion�� or ��a conscious visual experience of the lion,�� I am likely to answer in the positive.