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Furthermore, an overt behavior, such as a subjective report about a stimulus, is the result of a specific brain state immediately preceding the overt behavior. The bottom part of the figure illustrates how authors operating under the NCC assumption have in practice adopted a simplified view of this causation, whereby a subjective report in a contrastive experiment is construed as dependent not on the brain state following Tq, and thus indirectly on the entire preceding MCF2L sequence of stimuli and brain events, but instead only on whether or not an assumed NCC, with its associated conscious experience, was formed at Tc. Figure 4 A schematic illustration of a generic experimental paradigm, where a subject reports at time Tq, on a target stimulus that was presented at time Tx. All of the contrastive experiments considered in this paper are of this general type. The green arrows ... There is nothing wrong in general with making this type of simplification. For example, within a given, fixed experimental paradigm there might well be a clearly identifiable difference at some Tc between brain states which do and do not engender a later report of consciousness, for instance because of covert introspective judgment carried out at Tc, such that Tj = Tc, or some other threshold effect occurring somewhere in the brain around this time. However, what is suggested here is that if the experimental paradigm is modified, the same identifiable difference in brain state at Tc, or the same threshold effect, might no longer be what makes the difference for the report after Tq. In summary: Under the NCC assumption, it suffices to know the subject's current brain state and the NCC for the percept in question to know whether the subject is currently conscious of it. Under the view proposed here, there is no well-defined answer to the question of what a subject is conscious of at any one given time; one also has to specify (at least) when the subject will be asked about his or her perceptual experience, what other stimuli will be presented before that point in time, and whether the subject knows that the question is coming. This critique of the NCC assumption comes close to what has been argued by Blackmore (2012, 2015). It is also similar to Dennett's rejection of the idea of a ��Cartesian Theater�� in the brain, at which the information in conscious experience would come together for the benefit of�� ��whom? The Queen?�� (Dennett, 1991, p. 255). In general, the present account seems to stay roughly within the theoretical perimeter circumscribed by Dennett's multiple drafts theory (Dennett, 1991) and his ��fame in the brain�� metaphor (Dennett, 2001), but what has been proposed here delimits these further with a more precise model and definitions. There is compatibility and partial overlap also with the sensorimotor account of O'Regan and No? (2001).